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INTRODUCTION

Educational issues have been in the forefront of legal battles over
the past twenty or thirty years. One subject of these controversies
has been the right of a student with limited English language proficiency to secure remedial instruction. Historically, immigrants to
the United States learned the English language by submersion.
Through continuous exposure to English in the classroom, non-English-speaking children eventually became acquainted with the new
language. Today, because instructional methods have progressed,
* B.A., University of Texas; M.P.A., Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas; J.D., University of Texas School of Law; Assistant Professor, Louisiana
State University.
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techniques exist to facilitate that learning process, although the submersion approach is still used in some areas of the country to "instruct" linguistic minorities.
"English as a Second Language" (ESL) instruction consists of intensive remedial instruction in the English language for part of the
school day. Although the teaching methods and materials are
designed to remedy the student's English deficiencies, these programs have been criticized for fostering cognitive confusion by forcing children to learn to read and write in a second language before
they have acquired those skills in their native language.' Bilingual
education, on the other hand, teaches children concurrently in both
the English language and their primary language. Bilingual programs may be "transitional" in nature or may take a "maintenance"
approach. The primary goal of a bilingual transitional program is
to provide the students with instruction in two languages so that
they can make the transition to regular all-English classrooms as
quickly as possible, whereas the objective of a bilingual maintenance program is to maintain and develop the students' knowledge
of their primary language while simultaneously developing English
language skills.2 Often bilingual programs include a cultural component that seeks to enhance the child's cultural identity.'
Because of the diverse linguistic backgrounds of school children
throughout the United States, the right to remedial language instruction may place considerable responsiblities on educational systems depending on how that right is defined. This article will
explore the constitutional and statutory rights of students of limited
English language proficiency to ESL instruction, bilingual education, and bicultural education.
II.

REMEDIAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION AND COURT-ORDERED
DESEGREGATION

Courts possess inherent equitable powers to formulate remedial
1. See Note, Bilingual Education. Serna v. PortalesMunicipalSchools, 5 N.M.L.

REV.

321, 325-27 (1975).
2. This article will define bilingual education as being either one of these two alterna-

tive approaches. For a discussion of various remedial language models see Comment, Bilingual Education: An Educational and Legal Survey, 5 J. L. &

EDUC.

149 (1976).

3. Some legal commentators conclude that bilingual/bicultural programs are the constitutionally preferred remedial approach. See Comment, The ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 994-97 (1974).
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plans to remedy constitutional violations. The United States
Supreme Court stated in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education4 that "[Oince a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." 5 Calling upon these equitable powers, courts have ordered compensatory educational programs for minority students to
erradicate the lingering effects of past discrimination.6
Likewise, pursuant to these inherent powers of equity jurisdiction,
courts have also ordered remedial language programs as part of the
remedy for unconstitutional segregation in school systems. 7 In
United States v. Texas,8 upon a finding that a west Texas school
district had practiced discrimination against Mexican-American students, the district court ordered the implementation of a bilingual
and bicultural program designed to assist Mexican-American students in adjusting to their newly desegregated school environment.
4. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
5. Id at 15.
6. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 891-92, 900 (5th
Cir. 1966), aft'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub noma.
Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Courts have used their equitable powers to fashion comprehensive remedial plans to correct constitutional violations found in non-educational institutions as well. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 193-97 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (prison
system); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175-80 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (juvenile detention
homes); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376-77 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (state mental health
system).
7. See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 398 (5th Cir. 1976); Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 242 (D. Mass. 1975), supplemented, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D.
Mass. 1975), afl'd sub noma.
Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977). In Morales v. Shannon, the appellate court reversed the district
court's finding of no segregative intent with respect to the assignment of Mexican-American
students into two predominantly Spanish elementary schools, but remanded the case on
issues concerning bilingual/bicultural education. See id at 413-15. The school district offered these students a limited remedial language program and the district court on remand
was directed to examine that effort on the "off chance" that its inadequacies amounted to
discrimination. See Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. 342 F. Supp. 24, 29-38 (E.D. Tex. 1971). This decision was one of many remedial
orders issued by the federal court for the Eastern District of Texas in conjunction with the
desegregation of all school districts in the state. See United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp.
1043, 1060-62 (E.D. Tex. 1970). Previously, the district court had ordered the consolidation
of the San Felipe and Del Rio school districts. As part of that order the court directed the
parties to file a plan for the consolidation of the two districts which was to include a provision for bilingual/bicultural programs. See United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 24
(E.D. Tex. 1971).
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This comprehensive plan required both English and MexicanAmerican students in the elementary grades to develop skills in the
English and Spanish languages as well as to develop an appreciation
for both cultures. 9 In the context of desegregation suits, other courts
have ordered such remedial programs to compensate for educational deficiencies resulting from past unconstitutional segregation.
These courts reasoned that once school districts have violated a
child's right to an equal educational opportunity, they are under an
affirmative duty to mitigate the harshness of their past actions.1"
While such remedial orders are apparently within the discretionary power of a district court, they are not necessarily obligatory. In
Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1, ' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's adoption of a comprehensive remedial language plan even though the Denver school district had
been found to have unconstitutionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans. The court of appeals determined that the lower
court exceeded the limits of its remedial powers by ordering the
school district to follow a plan which effectively required a virtual
overhaul of the school system's entire approach to education in the
way it addressed matters of educational philosophy, curriculum and
instruction, internal governance, staffing patterns, and community
involvement with the schools.' 2 The Tenth Circuit did not preclude
the possibility that some type of remedial language program would
9. See United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 29-38 (E.D. Tex. 1971). The court
required the educational program of the district to incorporate, affirmatively recognize, and
value the cultural environment and language background of all its students in order to foster
the development of positive self-concepts in all children. The court's plan also called for the
establishment of a staff development training program and parental and community advisory councils. See id. at 29. For a discussion of this case see Comment, Bilingual-Bicultural
Education in Texas, 7 URB. L. ANN. 400, 400 (1974).
10. See Arvizu v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264, 1279-80 (W.D. Tex.
1973), modiffedon other grounds, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in Arvizu based its
remedial order on a finding of constitutionally impermissible segregation, although the court
admitted that such segregation was not the result of intentional state action. See id. at 1269.
Given more recent Supreme Court opinions, the liability portion of this order is questionable. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26566 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
11. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
12. See id at 482. In concluding that the district court's order was not properly tailored
to remedy the constitutional violation, the court observed that "instead of merely removing
obstacles to effective segregation, the court's order would impose upon school authorities a
pervasive and detailed system for the education of minority students. We believe this goes
too far." Id at 482.
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be appropriate and remanded the case for the district court to determine "what relief, if any" was necessary to remedy the language
deficiencies of Mexican-American students.' 3 The appellate court's
refusal to affirm the district court's remedial order could reflect a
reluctance on the part of a federal
court to interfere so pervasively
4
in an issue of local concern.'
The fact that ordering remedial language assistance to children
who have been the victims of unconstitutional segregation may
properly be within the scope of a court's remedial powers does not
establish that such programs are required absent the initial finding
of a constitutional violation. Is there an independent right to remedial language instruction and, if so, what type of instruction is required? The next four sections will explore the possible
constitutional and statutory grounds for recognizing such a right.
III.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO
REMEDIAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

The fourteenth amendment protects fundamental rights of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution and assures all individuals
equal protection under the law.
A.

FundamentalRight Analysis

To prove an unconstitutional infringement upon a fundamental
right, the plaintiff must establish that state action 5 is present and
that the right being infringed upon is explicitly or implicitly guaran13. See id. at 483.
14. See Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The district court in
Riles held that the use of I.Q. tests to place students in classes for the educable mentally
retarded unconstitutionally discriminated against minority students, yet declined to mandate
supplemental assistance to those children who had been disadvantaged. "It is not the role of
the court to reach out to order what would amount to a massive expenditure of funds for
supplemental assistance." Id. at 991.
15. Only state action is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The concept of what constitutes state action, however, has expanded
greatly since the Supreme Court first pronounced that postulate. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (illegal search by police officers constitutes state action proscribed
by fourth amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (exclusion of Blacks from
pre-primary elections of Democratic Association, tantamount to regular political party, constitutes state action proscribed by fifteenth amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
508 (1946) (imposition of criminal punishment by officials of "company town" upon distributor of religious literature constitutes state action proscribed by first and fourteenth
amendments).
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teed by the Constitution.' 6 After such a finding, the court will apply
a strict scrutiny analysis to state action that unduly burdens such a
right; the state must then justify its action by showing that it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that
the means cho17
goal.
that
achieve
to
tailored
sufficiently
sen are
In the context of remedial language programs, state action may be
present when states require compulsory attendance yet permit only
English to be the instructional language.'I The Supreme Court has
suggested that failure to provide any remedial instruction to students of limited English proficiency may constitute state action as
well. 19 Currently, twenty states make no statutory provisions either
prohibiting or requiring instruction in a language other than
English.2°
16. Fundamental rights are those which are "implicit in a concept of ordered liberty."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
149 (1968) (right to trial by jury in criminal cases); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940) (freedom of religion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of
speech).
17. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (durational residency requirements for voters violates Equal Protection Clause because not necessary to further
compelling state interest); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (state statutes
denying welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who have not resided in United States
for requisite number of years serve no compelling state interest and are unconstitutional);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (one year residency requirement for welfare recipients exercising their constitutitonal right to travel interstate unconstitutional because not necessary to promote compelling governmental interest).
18. Four states require that all subjects be taught in the English language exclusively.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80.1605 (1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115c-81(a) (Supp. 1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 11-102 (West 1972); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-7 (1977). Oklahoma allows
the State Board of Education to adopt rules for the provision of instruction concerning the
history and culture of minority races. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-119 (West Supp. 19821983).
Additionally, while Virginia does not require all subjects to be taught in the English language exclusively, the legislature recently enacted a provision which clearly freed school
districts from any obligation to teach the standard curriculum in language other than English. See VA. CODE § 22.1-212.1 (Supp. 1983). Similarly, the clear legislative preference in
South Dakota is for instruction which promotes the mastery of the English language, although instruction in another language is not expressly prohibited. See S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 13-33-11 (1982).
19. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974); see also Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe
Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1978); Serna v. Portales Ind. School
Dist., 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281-83 (D.N.M. 1972). In another context, the Supreme Court
held that the failure of the government to act constitutes state action. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (state's failure to correct a serious malapportionment of legislature violates fourteenth amendment).
20. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Mis-
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Assuming that state action is present, education must also be
shown to be a fundamental right. Education is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has never defined education per se as being a fundamental right. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has suggested that some minimum quantum of
education is implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution since it is essential to the exercise of first amendment rights as well as to participation in the political process. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,2 the Supreme Court upheld Texas' system of
school finance since it provided a basic education to all students
even though some students enjoyed more educational opportunities
than others. The Court, however, left open the question of whether
a system which failed to provide "some identifiable quantum of education" would be denying its students a fundamental right.22
Conceding that there is a fundamental right to some minimum
quantum of education, is placing a non-English-speaking child in an
all English-speaking classroom tantamount to denying them a minimum education? 23 The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
remedial language instruction as an independent right in one significant case to date, Lau v. Nichols. 24 Although Lau was decided on
statutory grounds, the Court noted that:
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming and the District of Columbia.
21. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. See id at 36-37.
23. Several legal scholars question the constitutionality of instruction solely in English
given the fundamental importance of education and the level of exclusion from educational
opportunities resulting from such a situation. See Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier.
The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 52, 71-91 (1974) (English-only
instruction may violate Due Process Clause as well as Equal Protection Clause since such
action should be subject to active judicial review); Johnson, The Constitutional Right ofBilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 975-85 (1974)
(complusory attendance laws coupled with English as exclusive language of instruction
causes pattern of linguistic exclusion which violates fundamental right of access to minimum/adequate education); Sugarman and Widess, Equal ProtectionforNon-English-Speaking School Children. Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 158-68 (1974) (balancing of
interests analysis warrants judicial intervention to protect rights of non-English-speaking
students to equal educational opportunities); Comment, BilingualEducationand Desegregration, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1564, 1588-89 (1979) (Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez may
be limited to objective differences in provision of education so that subjective differences of
students' abilities to understand English still may constitute absolute denial of educational
opportunities).
24. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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[B]asic English skills are at the very core of what these public schools
teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively
participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery ofpublic education. We
know that those who do not understand English are certain to find
their classroom
experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way
5
meaningful. 2
Thus, instruction in a language that is incomprehensible may

amount to a denial of a meaningful education or minimal educational opportunities.

Nevertheless, assuming English-only instruction deprives nonEnglish-speaking children of a fundamental right, the state may justify that choice of instruction by demonstrating that it serves a compelling state interest. Several justifications are plausible.26 The state
could argue that submersion is a sound pedagogical method of instructing students in a new language concurrently with other subjects, and urge the judiciary to defer to the knowledgeable judgment
of educators.27

Additionally, the state could contend that this

method conserves revenues while providing each student with the
same educational curriculum. Finally, the state could vindicate its
approach by reasoning that English-only instruction promotes a
unilingual society, thereby fostering assimilation into the main25. Id at 566 (emphasis added). Although he admits to crucial weaknesses in his argument, one commentator has asserted that failure to provide speakers of "Black English" with
remedial assistance effectively excludes them from participation in the educational program.
See van Geel, The Right to be Taught Standard English. Exploring the Implications ofLau v.
Nicholsfor Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 905 (1974).

26. Some commentators have advanced several conceivable rationalizations for such a
choice although they concurrently have noted the weaknesses of these rationales. See Johnson, The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 943, 985-89 (1974) (state's justifications may include desire to provide educational opportunity for all children to ensure every child linguistic competence in English .and
to provide an equal educational opportunity to as many children as possible while making
funds available for other socially desired programs); Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protection
for Non-English Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 177
(1974) (state might argue that it is job of family, not school, to teach English; that English
may be learned just as quickly through total immersion approach; that districts do not possess adequate monetary resources to aid non-English-speaking children; or that "English
only" policy fosters country's interest in single national tongue); see also Grubbs, Breaking
the Language Barrier." The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 52, 91
(1974) (such state action may be tolerated only on short term basis).
27. The same arguments could be made by school districts which chose not to provide
remedial language instruction in those states which do not statutorily address the issue.
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stream American community.28
The Supreme Court has declared, however, that a state cannot
rely solely upon a fiscal restraint argument to justify reducing expenditures if the result is the denial of a fundamental right to an
identifiable class.29 Moreover, the submersion technique is not the
least burdensome alternative to providing an equal educational opportunity to all children which would enable them to function in
American society; remedial language instruction could achieve that
same result in a less onerous fashion. Arguably, the submersion
method fails to teach non-English-speaking children effectively.
Thus, failure to provide remedial language instruction to non-English-speaking students may represent state action which denies those
students a fundamental right which no compelling state interest can
legitimize.
Suppose instead that the state or individual school district provides some type of remedial language instruction such as ESL. Is
this effort constitutionally sufficient or is bilingual/bicultural education constitutionally required? Some courts have held that an affirmative choice to provide instruction other than
bilingual/bicultural education constitutes state action for the purposes of fourteenth amendment review.3° It would be difficult to
establish bilingual/bicultural education as a fundamental right,
however, since the court would have to find that ESL fails to provide students with a minimum education assuming that there is an
implicit right to that minimum quantum.
Some legal commentators and educators argue that requiring
children to perform in another language before they have developed
cognitive skills in their primary language inevitably deprives them
of being able to function adequately in either language. 3 Neverthe28. For a discussion of the historical justification of English-only instruction see
Shelton, Legislative Control Over Public School Curriculum, 15 WILLAMETTE L.J. 473, 47781 (1979). The district court in Guadalupe also discussed the assimilation rationalization.
See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
1978).
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-33 (1969) (while state may legitimately attempt to limit expenditures for public programs, it may not accomplish such purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens).
30. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem.
School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1978).
31. See Margulies, Bilingual Education, Remedial Language Instruction, Title VI, and
Proofof DiscriminatoryPurpose: A Suggestive Approach, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 99,
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less, there is considerable authority which advocates the use of ESL
as an instructional approach; comparative research studies on ESL
and bilingual/bicultural instructional methods have failed to prove
that one method is clearly preferable to the other.32 Given this split
of authority, courts may refrain from the intense evaluation of ESL
which would be necessary to support a conclusion that ESL does not
provide a minimum or minimum/adequate education. The federal
judiciary's lack of expertise counsels against such interference as
does its respect for state and local autonomy.33
Several courts have reviewed the legal sufficiency of non-bilingual/bicultural remedial programs. In Keyes, the Tenth Circuit, observing that the Denver school system maintained a variety of
programs for students of limited English proficiency, refused to order a specific bilingual/bicultural program. 4 The court asserted
that the fourteenth amendment did not entitle such students "to an
educational experience tailored to their unique cultural and developmental needs."' 35 Likewise, in Otero v. Mesa County Valley School
Distict No. 5136 plaintiffs sought a particular type of bilingual instruction, claiming that the school district's efforts to assist students
of limited English proficiency were grossly inadequate. The district
court followed the Tenth Circuit's lead in Keyes and held that there
was no constitutional right to bilingual/bicultural education. The
court apparently was impressed by the good faith efforts of school
officials to provide the amount of remedial assistance they deemed
necessary. Overwhelmed by the volume of expert testimony on instructional methods, the court chose not to pronounce educational
policy for the school district but instead deferred to the judgment of
the local educators as to the appropriate type and level of assist103-05 (1981); Comment, Bilingual Education.: Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 5 N.M.L.
REV. 321, 324-27 (1975).
32. Rotberg, Some Legal andResearch Considerationsin EstablishingFederalPolicy in
BilingualEducation, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 149, 153-57 (1982). In Castanedav. Pickard,the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the controversy among experts concerning the advantages of these approaches to learning. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 n. 10

(5th Cir. 1981).
33. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 41-42 (1973); Keyes v.
specially concurring).
School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 490 (10th Cir. 1975) (Barrett, J.,
34. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 485 (10th Cir. 1975).
35. Id at 482.
36. 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), vacatedon othergrounds, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir.
1977), on remand, 470 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1979), afd, 628 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1980).
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ance. 3 ' The Ninth Circuit in Guadalupe Organization,Inc. v. Tempe
Elementary School DistrictNo. 338 reiterated the rationale of Keyes
and Otero. Since the school district adopted some remedial measures to cure the language deficiencies of Mexican-American and Yaqui Indian children, the appellate court determined that the school
district had no constitutional duty to provide the bilingual/bicultural program requested by the appellants.39
Although there is explicit language in each of these decisions that
bilingual/bicultural education is not constitutionally required, in
each case plaintiffs requested a particular program. The tone of each
opinion suggests that the courts were somewhat indignant of the
plaintiff's desire to substitute their judgment on educational matters
for that of either the school district or the judiciary.40 Arguably,
37. See id. at 172. The plan the plaintiffs sought in Otero was almost identical to the
one being sought in Keyes. The district judge was quite candid about his inability to decipher the claims of all the experts and eventually concluded:
I found the Cardenas Plan to be illogical, unbelievable and unacceptable, and the only
part of Dr. Cardenas' testimony I wholeheartedly agreed with was his response to a
question I asked him at the end of his stint on the witness stand. I asked him, in effect,
that if we assume a good faith though imperfect effort on the part of a school board to
provide any needed bilingual/bicultural education, is a school district and are the students better off under school board supervision or under the supervision of a poorly
informed federal judge. Dr. Cardenas quite candidly said that the school district and
the students are better off with the program being operated under the good faith efforts
of the school board and its employees. I agree, and I find that District 5 1, the members
of the board of District 51, the school officials, the principals, and in fact, all of the
defendants in this case were at all times acting in complete good faith in attempting to
ascertain the amount of bilingual/bicultural education which was needed by the students of District 51 and in providing the amount of that education which they believed
was needed. I am sure they did a better job than I could do.
Id. at 170.
38. 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
39. See id. at 1026-27; see also Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D.
Mont. 1981) (memorandum opinion) (no constitutional right to bilingual/bicultural education per se).
40. In Deerfield HulterianAssoc. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., the plaintiffs were Hutterites
who spoke Tyrolean German. See Deerfield Hutterian Assoc. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468
F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (N.D.S.D. 1979). Because of their religious beliefs, they challenged the
local school board's decision to offer a bilingual/bicultural education program in the town
of Ipswich instead of at the Hutterite colony. See id at 1222. The court refused to reverse
that board's decision on fourteenth amendment grounds stating:
The opportunity to be educated at the expense of the state is not a right which has no
limits. . . . The state does not have an obligation to educate every group or individual
according to the whims or desires of that individual or group, even if the desires are
based on religious beliefs. Here, the Ipswich School Board has made an education
available on a reasonable basis to the Hutterites. It need do no more.
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therefore, there is a right to dual language instruction when only
some negligible remedial assistance is offered if the precise plan is
left to the discretion of school officials.
When evaluating constitutional claims in conjunction with federal statutory rights, some courts have ordered bilingual/bicultural
education even where the school district offered a remedial language
program.4 ' Moreover, one court found a school district's bilingual
program to be legally inadequate. Critically evaluating the school
district's program, the court in Rios v. Read 42 determined that it
failed to identify those children in need of remedial instruction,
failed to test for reading and writing proficiency or to offer valid
tests for exit from the program, failed to establish a reliable review
of the performance of bilingual teachers, and neglected the cultural
aspect of bilingual education. 43 The court concluded that the New
York school district, under the pretense of offering bilingual education, was providing merely a basic course in English. Although Rios
was decided on federal statutory grounds, language in the opinion
of linsuggests that effective bilingual/bicultural education is a right
44
guistic minority students in the early years of schooling.
If failure to provide bilingual education does not deny children
their fundamental right to a minimum quantum of education, then a
school district need only show that its remedial language program is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 45 Generally, the judiId. at 1229.
41. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds,499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). In Serna, the district court was not impressed with the school district's assertions that a lack of funds and a shortage of teachers
limited the amount of remedial assistance they could provide. The court ordered that they
expand their programs, increase recruiting efforts for teachers, and investigate and utilize
potential sources of funding in order to provide an equal educational opportunity for Mexican-American students. Id at 1283. The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision
on Title VI grounds. See id at 1283.
42. 480 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. Id at 18-24.
44. See id at 23. The court stated that:
A denial of educational opportunities to a child in the first years of schooling is not
justified by demonstrating that the educational program employed will teach the child
English sooner than programs comprised of more extensive Spanish instruction. While
the District's goal of teaching Hispanic children the English language is certainly
proper, it cannot be allowed to compromise a student's right to meaningful education
before proficiency in English is obtained.

Id at 23.
45. Where neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes are involved, state action is
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ciary will not interfere in state action of this nature, providing it is
not palpably arbitrary. Remedial language programs have been approved under a rational basis review 46 and in the context of other
educational concerns school districts have prevailed under this less
rigorous level of scrutiny.4
B.

Equal ProtectionAnalysis

Courts will also strictly scrutinize state action that classifies or discriminates among similarly situated persons based on a suspect classification: race, national origin, or alienage. Again, state action
may be defined as requiring all children to attend school contemporaneously with prohibiting instruction in a language other than English or with failing to provide remedial instruction.48 Yet linguistic
constitutinally sound if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See,
e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237 (1981) (given budgetary constraints, Congress
may rationally limit supplemental security income allowances to Medicade recipients in
public institutions); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 168-71 (1980)
(Railroad Retirement Act's grandfather provision which expressly preserves "windfall" benefits for some classes of employees is rational method of drawing lines between groups of
employees in order to phase out those benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970) (Maryland regulation placing absolute limit of two hundred fifty dollars per month
on amount of grant under AFDC, regardless of size of family or its need, is rational means
of allocating limited public welfare funds).
46. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027
(9th Cir. 1978); Deerfield Hutterian Assoc. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 123031 (D.S.D. 1979).
47. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (state school
financing system); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 252-53 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(denying education to illegal aliens is "rational" means to legitimate state purpose). Plyler
involved a state law which prohibited school districts from including illegal aliens in their
student count for the purposes of determining the appropriate level of state financial assistance. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Burger concluded that in the absence of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the statute was rationally related to legitimate state
interests in utilizing the resulting savings to improve the quality of education, to enhance
other social programs, or to reduce the tax burden. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 252 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). A commentator evaluating the rights of speakers of Black English
concluded that school districts which failed to provide those students with special instruction
would prevail under a rational basis review. See van Geel, The Right To Be Taught Standard English. Exploring the Implications of Lau Y. Nicholsfor Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 899 (1974).
48. A problem arises, however, with respect to state action under an equal protection
analysis. The state through its central education agency may be liable for the acts or omissions of individual school districts, if under state law it is responsible for supervising those
districts and for requiring standards of instruction. See Idaho Migrant Council v. Bd. of
Educ., 647 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. School Dist., 577 F.2d 1339, 1347
(6th Cir. 1978). But should the state's act prohibiting dual language instruction or its omis-
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minorities are not necessarily members of a suspect class since their
alleged unequal treatment is not based directly upon a racial or national origin classification. 49 Nevertheless, their learning disability
coincides precisely with a characteristic that distinguishes national
origin groups. Because of this intimate association between language and ethnicity, 0 linguistic minorities may be treated as a suspect class." Moreover, a recent Supreme Court decision suggests
that the definition of a suspect class is expanding to include groups
5 2
which are saddled with disabilities beyond their control.
Even if the state action involves a suspect classification, it must
still be discriminatory to be unconstitutional. A statute or policy
providing for instruction only in English is neutral on its face in that
it treats all children alike. Its application to children of differing
linguistic skills, however, may operate to discriminate against nonEnglish-speaking students. Examining the performance of linguistic
minority students tends to reveal that such discrimination may exsion be imputed to the individual districts for purposes of establishing a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, since intent is a necessary element? If possible, each independent
school district may have the right to a hearing on whether its remedial language policy is the
result of discrimination. See United States v. Gregory-Portland Ind. School Dist., 654 F.2d
989, 998 (5th Cir. 1981).
49. Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1026 n.3
(9th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court recently held that illegal aliens per se do not constitute
a suspect class either. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982); see also Martin Luther
King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1327-28 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (students whose unsatisfactory performance was based on cultural, social, and
economic handicaps rather than physical handicaps did not constitute a suspect class even
though they all happened to be black).
50. Mexican-Americans have been held to be an ethnically identifiable minority group
for purposes of an equal protection analysis. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School
Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1972).
51. See Johnson, The ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Childrento an EqualEducational
Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 979-81 (1974). Conversely, for speakers of Black English the link between language and ethnicity is weaker since features of Black English are
found in the speech patterns of other groups. See van Geel, The Right To Be Taught Standard English. Exploring the Implications of Lau v. Nicholsfor Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 898 (1974).
52. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n. 14 (1982). The court observed that:
The experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities
upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the
kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish.
Id. at 216 n.14.
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3

But defining the right to equal educational opportunities in
terms of equalized performances or outcomes is problematic since 54
a
wide variety of socio-economic factors affect achievement levels;
furthermore, the evaluation instruments themselves are subject to
multiple interpretations and errors.
Reliance on educational outcomes may not be necessary to conclude that linguistic minorities are being denied equal opportunities.
Arguably, failure to provide any remedial instruction is a blatant
constitutional violation; courts may take judicial notice of the fact
that a child in an all-English class who does not speak English is not
in the same position as one who does." The case of Brown v. Board
of Education5 6 established that segregated schools were inherently
unequal; likewise, English-only instruction may be inherently unequal and discrimination can be assumed. In concluding that segregation with sanction of law has the tendency to retard the
educational and mental development of black children,57 the Brown
Court recognized the relationship between segregation and educational, psychological, and social harms. 8 Correspondingly, placing
the majority's language in a position of supremacy in the classroom
denigrates the linguistic minority's language and culture, thereby
generating a stigma of inferiority. 9 This stigma coupled with inist.

53. See Rangel & Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas
Schools, 7 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 307, 321-22 (1972); see also Serna v. Portales Mun.
Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1282-83 (D.N.M. 1972) (poorer performance by Spanish-speaking children on I.Q. tests as compared to Anglo students indicates lack of equal educational
opportunity if school program does not reflect needs of minority), afl'd on other grounds, 499
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). To support the finding of a constitutional violation the district
court in Serna relied heavily on evidence that Spanish surnamed pupils performed less well
than others on achievement and I.Q. tests. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp.
1279, 1282-83 (D.N.M. 1972), aft'don other grounds, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). But see
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Col. 1975)
(poor performance is not necessarily the result of language deficiencies).
54. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 411,
430 (1973).
55. See id at 430-31; see also Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protectionfor Non-English
Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 162 (1974) (discrimination
against Spanish-speaking children taught only in English is readily apparent).
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. See id at 494-95.
58. For a discussion of sociological data and its use in desegregation cases see Fiss,
Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564
(1965) and Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklinburg Case-Its Significancefor Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
59. See Roos, BilingualEducation. The Hispanic Response to Unequal EducationalOp-
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comprehsible instruction, effectively deprives them of an equal access to education.
Even so, the purpose behind the decision to offer instruction exclusively in English must be tainted with an intent to discriminate.60
Neutral state action serving legitimate goals does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause solely because it affects a greater proportion of one group than another.6 Yet an invidious intent need not
be the sole motivating factor upon which the state action is rooted. 62
The question is whether a discriminating purpose was a motivating
factor in the decision, and disproportionate impact is relevant evidence to support that conclusion. 63 Some courts have located this
forbidden purpose by presuming that the state, like an individual,
presumes the natural and foreseeable consequences of its actions.'
The Supreme Court, however, recently confined this presumption to
an inference by requiring proof that the cause of action was chosen
at least in part by and not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.65 Nonetheless, a positive foreseeable consequences test is still some evidence of an impermissible purpose.6 6
portunity, 42 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. Ill, 126 (1978); Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13
HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 133, 151-53 (1978); Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protectionfor
Non-English Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 172-76
(1974). Expert testimony concerning the feelings of inadequacy and lowered self-esteem
experienced by Spanish surnamed children faced with a school environment in which only
the English language was acceptable may have influenced the Tenth Circuit in Serna. See
Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1974).
60. In the absence of previous segregation by law, proof of segregative intent is a prerequisite to remedial orders. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973). Prior to
Keyes some courts had only required that a significant nexus exist between state action and
the resulting denial of educational opportunity. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School
Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972).
61. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
62. See id at 242.
63. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977).
64. Many of these decisions involved a school district's superimposition of a neighborhood assignment policy on a racially segregated housing pattern producing the "unavoidable consequence" of segregated schools. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist.,
467 F.2d 142, 146-49 (5th Cir. 1972) (school board by rigid superimposition of neighborhood
school plan upon historic pattern of marked residential segregation which had transposed
residential homogeneity into ethnic and racial homogeneity in public school system, produced inevitable segregation); see also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380
(5th Cir. 1976); Arvizu v. Waco Ind. School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264, 1268-69 (W.D. Tex.
1973).
65. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n. 25 (1979).
66. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979); Columbus Bd.
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Finding an invidious intent in the failure to provide remedial language instrucion is a difficult task. 67 Such a failure has a disproportionate effect upon linguistic minorities and has the inevitable result
of inhibiting their participation in the educational program.68 Yet
these two propositions alone are insufficient to prove discriminatory
intent. Additional proof of a rich history of an unequal treatment of
linguistic minorities coupled with the school district's decision to offer English-only instruction, however, may establish an invidious
purpose.69 Such additional proof may be hard to adduce for linguistic minorities who are new immigrants and have no pattern of treatment from which to draw evidence. The argument could be made
that showing a history of discrimination against those groups which
are not of the majority language and culture provides the necessary
proof.7° In addition, the presumptions discussed by the Supreme
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); see also United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 168-70 (5th Cir. 1977) (neighborhood assignment plan complemented
by gerrymandering, allowing dual overlapping zones, and tailoring design, location, and size
of school to fit only racial or ethnic group demonstrated pervasive intent to discriminate);
Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 980-82 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (given historical background of
I.Q. testing, use of such tests to place disproportionate number of blacks in mentally retarded classes established discriminatory intent); Margulies, Bilingual Education, Remedial
LanguageInstruction, Title VI, andProofof DiscriminatoryPurpose. 4 SuggestedApproach,
17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 99, 137 (1981) (author suggests that Supreme Court has
recently given greater weight to this type of evidence).
67. For a discussion of the duties of school districts under Lau and Brown including the
difficulty of establishing discriminatory intent see Comment, Bilingual Educationand Desegregation, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1564 (1979). In United States v. Gregory-PortlandInd School
Dist., the Fifth Circuit implied that a now-repealed Texas statute permitting English only
instruction was motivated by a xenophobic impulse following World War I and provided no
probative evidence for current racial prejudice. See United States v. Gregory-Portland Ind.
School Dist., 654 F.2d 989, 999-1001 (5th Cir. 1981).
68. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 235 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court
struck down a Texas statute which denied local school districts the benefit of state funds
which were used to educate illegal aliens. Justice Blackmun professed in his concurring
opinion that "it does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of a complete denial
of education upon those children targeted by the State's classification." Id at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Likewise, it does not take an advanced degree to predict that instruction exclusively in English will deny linguistic minorities equal access to educational
opportunities.
69. See Comment, Margulies, Bilingual Education, Remedial Language Instruction, Title
VI and Proof of DiscriminatoryPurpose: A Suggested Approach, 17 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PRons. 99, 152-53 (1981); The ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S.CAL. L. REV. 943, 946-53 (1974).
70. That is, invidious purpose lies in the state's preferential treatment of the majority
language culture vis-a-vis that of linguistic minorities. "That a legislature seeks to advantage one group does not, as a matter of logic or of common sense, exclude the possibility that
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Court in Keyes may be applicable to this situation as well.7' If there
is proof of historical discrimination against one linguistic minority
group then the burden should be upon the state to show that it has
not treated other linguistic minorities equally disfavorably. Unlike
the Keyes situation, however, where the segregation of one minority
group in a school system has a reciprocal effect on the racial composition of other schools, discrimination against one linguistic minority does not necessarily result in discrimination against another.
Nevertheless, continual preference of the majority's language over
minority groups' languages will produce the same effect on all such
groups and will be some evidence of an invidious intent to discriminate against linguistic minorities generally.
If discriminatory intent is shown, the state may rebut this evidence by showing that the same result would have occurred even in
the absence of such intent.72 In the context of remedial language
instruction where performance evaluations have supported the finding of an unequal educational opportunity, the state or school district must show that factors other than the instructional method
caused the students' poor performance. 73 If the finding of a constitutional violation was premised upon a denial of equal access argument, then the state or school district must show that it would have
chosen to offer English-only instruction in any event, presumably
because of the soundness of that approach.
If neither argument is successful, then the state must carry the
difficult burden of proving that its policy is necessary to accomplish
a compelling state interest and that a less intrusive but equally effecit also intends to disadvantage another." Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 282
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-208 (1973).
72. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270-71 n. 21 (1977). There is language in some previous lower court decisions to suggest that
the inquiry revolved around the question of whether affirmative action to the contrary
would have remedied the situation rather than whether the same result woud have occurred
because of the overriding presence of neutral factors. See United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863 n. 22 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
73. Numerous studies conclude that socio-economic factors are often responsible for a
child's academic performance; moreover, some attitudinal studies detected no difference between limited English-speaking students in bilingual programs and those in regular classrooms on a range of measures including attitude, self-concept, motivation, social values,
absenteeism, grade retention and dropout rates. See Rotberg, Some Legal and Research
Considerations in Establishing Federal Policy in Bilingual Education, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV.
149, 152-156 (1982).
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tive method is unavailable.14 The court might require the independent school districts to justify their instructional methods similarly to
the way in which employers must validate employment tests if such
employment practice excludes a disproportionate number of
minorities.75
If the state or school district offers instead some remedial assistance, is it nevertheless a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
not to offer a bilingual/bicultural program? An argument could be
made that any program other than bilingual education is inherently
unequal and creates the same stigma of inferiority by forcing linguistic and cultural assimilation.76 Although bilingual/bicultural
programs may nurture the development of limited English-speaking
students and offer to them a greater potential for success, 77 ESL pro-

grams do not necessarily deny them an equal educational opportunity.78 Offering an ESL program instead of a bilingual/bicultural
program may be discriminatory if the school district has a history of
past discrimination.
Discriminatory intent would be even more difficult to establish in
this instance. The Supreme Court in Keyes, however, noted that the
remoteness in time of past segregative acts has no relevance to the
issue of present discriminatory intent. 79 Therefore, if the state or
74. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
75. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employment practices
which operate to exclude disproportionate number of minorities must be related to job
performance).
76. See van Geel, The Right to Be Taught StandardEnglish: Exploring the Implications
of Lau v. Nicholsfor Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 871-73 (1974).
77. See Kobrick, A Model Act Providingfor TransitionalBilingual Education Programs
in Public Schools, 9 HARV. J.ON LEGis. 260, 265-67 (1972) (bilingual programs may enhance ability of linguistic minorities to learn English while encouraging development of
native language skills); Montoya, Bilingual-BiculturalEducation.: Making Equal Educational
OpportunitiesAvadable to National Origin Minority Students, 61 GEO. L. J. 991, 996 (1973)
(nationwide commitment to provide productive bilingual problems needed to compensate
for past neglect of non-English-speaking students and to provide them with equal educational opportunities).
78. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe .Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029
(9th Cir. 1978). In Martin Luther King Jr.Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd.of Educ.,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the practice of labeling culturally and eco.iomically handicapped children as educable mentally retarded stigmatized them and violated the fourteenth amendment. See Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School Children v.
Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1326-28 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
79. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973). Furthermore, on remand the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's rejection of expert testimony on practices
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school district historically pursued an arguably discriminatory policy of providing English-only instruction, that policy may be relevant to prove that current remedial programs are vain attempts to
fulfill constitutional obligations and are not designed to provide
equal educational opportunity."0 Additionally, if a school system
practiced intentional discrimination in the past, it is under a continuing duty to eradicate the effects of that action.8 ' In the context of
intentional segregation, the Supreme Court defined part of the duty
as "the obligation not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects." ' 82 Offering
remedial language instruction may not fulfill this affirmative duty;
and, evidence that the school district widened the gap between nonEnglish-speaking students and English-speaking students by expanding its honors curriculum or programs for gifted and talented
children instead of enhancing its remedial language program suggests that an intent to discriminate may linger.
Nevertheless, the state could probably show that the same educational methods would be employed, absent any lingering invidious
intent. Many authorities on language instruction endorse ESL and
other remedial programs; bilingual education is not necessarily the
optimal aproach for all situations. 8 3 Given the split of authority on
put into effect after the initiation of the suit as not probative of discriminatory intent. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 474 (10th Cir. 1975).
80. See Columbus Bd.of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 501-02 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that a definite causal relationship must be established
between past acts or omissions and current practices. See id at 501-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, in two recent cases concerning the adequacy of remedial language programs, the appellate courts remanded the cases to the lower courts to evaluate whether needs
of limited English- speaking students currently were being addressed. See Idaho Migrant
Council v. Board of Educ., 647 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1981); Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522
F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Mont. 1981) (memorandum opinion). But see United States v. Gregory-Portland Ind. School Dist., 654 F.2d 989, 1002 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Mexican schools" operated by school district thirty years ago not necessarily motivated by invidious intent and
their existence proves nothing in regard to current motives).
81. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979).
82. Id at 538; see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1979);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460-62 (1972).
83. Several studies suggest in fact that bilingual instruction is more likely to succeed
when the children being taught come from middle and upper rather than lower socio-economic environments. See Rotberg, Some Legal andResearch Considerationsin Establishing
FederalPolicy in Bilingual Education, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 149, 159-60 (1982).
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what is the most advantageous approach, 84 it seems doubtful that
the judiciary would find that choosing to provide ESL instruction
violates the Equal Protection Clause, even if there is evidence of
choice would most likely surpast discriminatory omissions. 85 That
86
vive a rational basis review as well.
C. An Intermediate Review

The preceeding discussion centers on the traditional two tier judicial review of alleged fourteenth amendment violations whereby
courts strictly scrutinize state action which deprives individuals of a
fundamental right or classifies them based upon race, national origin, or alienage, and apply a rational relationship test to other actions. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest that the
Court is adopting a less categorical approach.87
84. In Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Col.
1975) (memorandum opinion), the district judge observed that:
[11f the expert testimony proved anything, it proved that educational theory is not an
exact science, and an expert can be found who will testify to almost anything. Listening
to these experts causes one to conclude that if psychiatrists' disagreements are to be
compared to differences between educators, psychiatrists are almost of a single mind.
Id. at 164. Federal courts, however, have not refrained from issuing far-reaching remedial
orders to reform other public institutions. See Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 189 (N.D.
Ohio 1976).

85. For a collection of essays on educational policies and judicial decision-making see
& R. ANSON, EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1977).
86. Cf Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027
(9th Cir. 1978).
87. An intermediate level of review is available for classifications based upon gender.
See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (New York law permitting unwed
mother but not unwed father to block adoption of their child by withholding consent violates Equal Protection Clause because it bears no substantial relation to any important state
interest); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979) (Alabama statutory scheme imposing alimony requirements on husbands but not wives violates Equal Protection Clause); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (statutory gender classification prohibiting sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under twenty-one and to females under eighteen violates Equal Protection Clause because it does not serve important governmental objectives nor is substantially
related to achievement of professed objectives). Classifications based upon legitimacy are
also subject to an intermediate level of review. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lafi, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76
(1978) (classifications based upon legitimacy invalid under fourteenth amendment if not
substantially related to permissible state interests); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-68
(1977) (Illinois laws allowing illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only
from their mothers while allowing legitimate children to inherit from both parents violates
Equal Protection Clause); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (provision of Social
Security Act waiving proof of dependency for legitimate heirs while requiring such proof for
illegitimate claimants is constitutionally permissible because it is reasonably related to likelihood of dependency at death).
R.
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In resolving whether or not state action is unconstitutional, the
Court appears to be using a weighted assessment of several factors:
1) the importance of the interest involved; 2) the degree of infringement upon that right; 3) the invidiousness of the state's classification; and, 4) the legitimacy of the state's interest.8 8 Societal and
constitutionally important rights are replacing fundamental rights.
Suspect classes are being substituted by disadvantaged classes whose
disabilities stem from their historically inferior treatment, their
political impotency, and their lack of control over the trait upon
which the classification is based. The inquiry into the justification
for the state's action is being transformed from a question of
whether it serves a compelling state interest or whether it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest to whether it furthers a substantial goal and whether the means chosen to achieve that goal are
appropriate.
Illustrative of this approach applied to educational issues is the
recent Supreme Court case of Plyler v. Doe.89 In Ply/er the Court
reviewed a Texas law which withheld from local school districts
state funds that were to be used to educate illegal aliens and which
authorized local school districts to deny enrollment of these children
in their public schools. 9° The district court struck down the statute
holding that the net effect of the law, barring undocumented children from public schools, was not rationally related to the state interest of improving the quality of education. 9 '
Using an intermediate level of review, the Supreme Court examined the law in light of the four factors listed above. 92 Writing
for the majority, Justice Brennan acknowledged that public education is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution, but argued that
"neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable

88. See San Antonio Ind.School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Marshall observed the spectrum of standards used by the

Court in reviewing alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause. See id at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Apparently the Ninth Circuit adopts such a variable review. See
Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1974); see
also Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
89. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
90. See id at 205; TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. art. 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
91. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589-92 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980), a~f'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
92. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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' The majority recfrom other forms of social welfare legislation."93
ognized the fundamental role of education in sustaining the nation's
political and cultural heritage. Additionally, the Court recognized a
new fundamental function of education: that of maintaining an ordered society through its role as a socializing agent.94 Apparently
assuming that school districts would opt not to admit undocumented
children in the absence of state funding, the Court inferred that the
practical effect of the statute would be to totally deprive those children of this right.95
Justice Brennan stated that the class affected by that denial was
part of a disfavored group and that the legislative classification,
while not facially invidious, was of the type which "give[s] rise to
recurring constitutional difficulties. ' 96 Language in the opinion also
suggests that the Court attached importance to the fact that the classification affected a minority group which was held in low esteem by
the majority of citizens.97 In sum, the Court observed that the Texas
law imposed "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountablefor their disabling status."98 Given the importance of
the right, the degree of intrusiveness of the state's action, and the
invidiousness of the classification, the Court concluded that the state
failed to justify its action by showing that it furthered substantial
state interests or that this group was an appropriate target to be burdened in order to achieve those goals.99

93. Id. at 221.
94. See id. at 222 n. 20. The Court stated that "the significance of education to our
society is not limited to its political and cultural fruits. The public schools are an important

socializing institution, imparting those shared values through which social order and stability are maintained." Id at 222 n.20.
95. See id. at 222. The school district involved in this suit did not actually prohibit
undocumented children from attending its schools, but required them to pay tuition, which

arguably, would have the same effect as an absolute bar to admission. See id. at 206.
96. Id. at 217.
97. See id. at 222. The Court stated that "by depriving the children of any disfavored

group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of
esteem in which it is held by the majority." Id. at 222.

98. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). Two of the justices concurring in the opinion also
commented on the overall unfairness of the classification. Justice Blackmun argued that the

state action involved forced undocumented children into being members of a permanent
underclass. See id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Powell further observed that
the classification effectively punished innocent children because of their parents' violations
of immigration laws. See id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. See id at 224-30. The state argued that the statute was designed to discourage

illegal immigration, to avoid a drain on the state's purse, and to preserve resources for its
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An application of this type of analysis to state action which prohibits remedial language instruction or which fails to provide any
assistance should culminate in the finding of a constitutional violation. The right involved is the same "important" right the Court
discussed in Plyler. The degree of infringement is comparable to
that involved in Pl/er as well. English-only instruction effectively
denies non-English-speaking children a meaningful education in the
same way that terminating state funding for the education of undocumented children induces local districts to choose the permissible route to closing their doors to them."° Linguistic minorities also
are members of a disfavored group, who are not responsible for
their disabilities; moreover, the low esteem in which they are held
by the majority stems from the higher value that is placed on assimilation as opposed to cultural pluralism.
Given this assessment, it is doubtful that the state's interests in
fiscal restraint, local autonomy, and a homogenous society justify
burdening this group in order to achieve those goals. Failure to provide bilingual/bicultural education, however, may not amount to a
constitutional violation under this analytical approach. If some remedial assistance is offered, the degree of infringement is correspondingly less and courts may abstain from interfering.
D. The Remedy
It may be argued that the protection now afforded linguistic minorities by federal statutes diminishes the significance of establishing a constitutional violation. While the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act' 0 ' requires that affirmative steps be taken to alleviate language barriers, these steps may not be affirmative strides. A
constitutional violation, on the other hand, allows the court to exercise its broad, equitable powers to eliminate the evil "root and
branch." 2 Thus, while federal law may make ESL programs availlawful residents. The Court responded that the law would not deter illegal immigration
since undocumented workers did not come to the United States in search of an education
and that the record did not show that money spent on the education of undocumented chil-

dren diminished the quality of education or that the overall quality of education would be
improved as a result of any savings generated by their exclusion. See id at 230.
100. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982).

101. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f)(1976).
102. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). The harm could be eradicated by exempt-
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able to linguistic minorities, judicial relief may afford them bilingual/bicultural education."0 3 Moreover, a Title VI violation
arguably requires a showing that a significant number of children
are affected, whereas one child of limited English proficiency may
be entitled to such a bilingual/bicultural program under the
Constitution. 1o4
Recently, however, the Supreme Court limited a court's remedial
authority in desegregation cases to redressing only the incremental
segregative effect which a school district's actions had on the racial
distribution of students. 0 5 In other words, in formulating a remedy
courts must ask, "but for the constitutional violations, would the
school district reflect this degree of integration?" Translated to the
remedial language context, the question becomes, "but for the unconstitutional omissions, would bilingual/bicultural education be a
part of the curriculum?" If the answer is negative, then perhaps
06
neither federal law nor the Constitution require such programs.

ing non-English-speaking students from compulsory attendance laws as well. See Grubb,
Breaking the Language Barrier. The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 52, 87-92 (1974).
103. But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 481-82 (10th Cir. 1975) (court
order imposing bilingual/bicultural program oversteps boundary of its remedial powers).
104. See Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 171 (D.
Col. 1975). But see Comment, The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in America's Public
Schools: Testing Groundfora Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation of Equal Protection,
17 DUQ. L. REV. 473, 493 n. 144 (1979) (courts will read a significant number requirement
into constitutional right).
105. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); see also Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
106. See Comment, Bilingual Education and Desegregation, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1564,
1585-86 (1979). The author argues that if the Constitution requires some type of remedial
language program it may also require that assignment to the program's classes be non-discriminatory. Opening the program to all students on a voluntary basis and providing reliable exit criteria to insure that it does not become a dead-end track may suffice. See id The
Fifth Circuit has held that language grouping per se is unobjectionable, even in school districts with a past history of discrimination since the benefits of such a practice might outweigh the adverse effects of such segregation. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 998
(5th Cir. 1981). The court, however, warned that care must be taken, particularly in those
districts with a history of past discriminatory treatment, to insure that any labeling does not
confuse a low level of English proficiency with a low level of intelligence, thereby stigmatizing students of limited English proficiency as inferior on the basis of their ethnic background. See id at 998; see also Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1975)
(ability groupings not unconstitutional per se).
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 0 7 prohibits any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating on the
basis of race, color, or national origin. 08 Unlike a constitutional
violation which clearly necessitates a showing of discriminatory intent, a Title VI violation may be established by showing that the
state action in question produced discriminatory effects. In interpreting federal administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) pursuant to
section 602 of the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court in Lau v.
Nichols'0 9 stated that "[d]iscrimination is barred which has that ef
fect even though no purposeful design is present. . ...
-11
The Court's holding in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke"' that the scope of Title VI is co-extensive with that of the
Constitution, however, may have overruled sub silentlo Lau's discriminatory effects test"12 by requiring a showing of discriminatory
intent for Title VI violations. 1 3 Arguably, the Lau Court made an
implicit finding of intent using a less refined intermediate standard
of review. The plaintiffs in Lau were Chinese-speaking students in
San Francisco who were members of a race which bore scars from
decades of discriminatory treatment." 4 Additionally, the San Fran107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
108. Since most states and school districts receive federal assistance, establishing a Title
VI violation would be an effective incentive for discontinuing discriminatory practices.
109. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
110. Id at 568 (emphasis in original).
111. 438 U.S. 265, 287, 340 (1978).
112. See Margulies, Bilingual Education, Remedial Language Instruction, Title VI and
Proofof DiscriminatoryPurpose: 4 SuggestedApproach, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 99,
128-30 (1981); Comment, Bilingual Education and Desegregation, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1564,
1576 (1979). But see Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d
1022, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
113. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (discriminatory purpose must be shown to establish violation of Title VI and although school district's remedial
language program may have been deficient there was no evidence of intentional discrimination); see also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287, 340 (1978)
(Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications violative of Equal Protection Clause).
Prior to Bakke, the Tenth Circuit held that a school district's remedial language program
violated Title VI because it had the effect of discrimination even though, arguably, no purposeful design was present. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th
Cir. 1974).
114. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
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cisco public schools required English proficiency as a pre-requisite
for graduation yet provided no remedial instruction. In light of
these facts, the Court determined that the state and school system's
actions were "earmarks of the discrimination banned by the [federal] regulations."' 5 Such circumstances could constitute the type
of intentional discrimination barred by the fourteenth amendment
under an intermediate level of review as well. On the other hand,
after concluding that HEW had reasonably exercised its authority
under the Civil Rights Act," 16 the Court attached great significance
to the rules and guidelines promulgated by HEW which seem to
focus on the effects of state action when establishing liability." 7
If state action which merely results in a disproportionate impact
upon linguistic minorities suffices to violate Title VI, must the action
concern a situation as egregious as that of Lau? Justice Blackmun,
in his concurring opinion, emphasized the magnitude of the impact
cautioning that "for me numbers are at the heart of this case."' 18
Consequently, some courts have attached significance to the number
of limited English proficient students who are affected when examining whether or not Title VI has been violated.'
Other courts,
however, have attached less importance to the number of linguistic
minorities involved. 2 ° In Rios, for example, the court found a Title
VI violation where only seven percent of the school's students were
of Hispanic origin. 121
An additional question is whether Title VI is violated only when
115. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
116. See id at 567-69.
117. See id at 566-67.

118. Id. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974) (viola-

tion of Title VI found where substantial group deprived of meaningful education); Otero v.
Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 165, 171 (D. Colo. 1975) (no
violation of Title VI found where only about eight percent of students were of limited English proficiency and school district was making more than token effort to remedy their
deficiencies).
120. See Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (D. Mont. 1981). The

court refused to grant a summary judgment motion against plaintiffs alleging a Title VI
violation. In dicta, the court asserted that the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and the
Civil Rights Act mandate remedial assistance regardless of the number of children affected
by the state action. See id at 164-65. However, the court requested the parties to submit
further evidence on the number of students having limited proficiency in English and the
degree of their impediment. See id at 164-65.
121. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 23-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Cintron v.

Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 59, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (school dis-
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no remedial assistance is offered or whether limited remedial programs will constitute a violation of Title VI. The Ninth Circuit in
Guadalupe refused to find a statutory violation since the school district provided remedial instruction "intended to assure that [English
deficient students] derived equivalent value from [the school's] existing programs."'' 22 Comparatively, the Tenth Circuit in Serna v.
Portales Municipal Schools123 determined that placing Spanishspeaking children in all English classes deprived them of their statutory rights. 24 One court, however, has found a statutory violation
even when school districts offered some remedial assistance, 25 and
in Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School District,126 the district
court held that the school district was in violation of Title VI althrough five and
though it offered a bilingual program in grades one
27
grades.
post-elementary
the
in
instruction
ESL
If narrowly interpreted, Lau could require merely that school districts offer some type of remedial language assistance if substantial
numbers of limited English proficient students are enrolled in their
schools. The Lau Court refrained from ordering a specific remedy
suggesting instead that "[t]eaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is one choice. Giving
instructions to this group in Chinese is another. There may be
others."' 28 The administrative regulations to which the court detrict's remedial program violated Title VI where approximately twenty percent of students
were of Hispanic origin.)
122. Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1028 n.5
(9th Cir. 1978). The appellate court also noted that there was no evidence that the remedial
program offered was the type of dead-end track referred to in Lau. See id at 1029-30; see
alsoCastanedav. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1006-09 (5th Cir. 1982) (Lau does not dictate type
of remedial assistance required and school district's programs, while deficient in some areas,
held to be legally sufficient.)
123. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
124. There was evidence in the record, however, that the school district did offer a
bilingual program in the first grade and ESL instruction for English deficient students in the
second through sixth grades. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281
(D.N.M. 1972). The fact that the school never applied for federal funds nor accepted state
funds for bilingual programs, even though undisputed evidence showed that Spanish surnamed students did not reach the achievement levels attained by their Anglo counterparts,
may have influenced the appellate court. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d
1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1974).
125. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 18-20 (E.D. N.Y. 1978).
126. 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
127. See id at 64.
128. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 565 (1974).
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ferred in finding an effects-oriented violation' 2 9 also did not specify

the type of remedial program required.13 0 Thus,
Title VI itself may
13 1
programs.
bilingual/bicultural
not mandate
After the Lau decision HEW issued a new set of guidelines, based
on the recommendations of a special Task Force, to measure a
school district's compliance with Title VI. 132 These guidelines, still
in effect, 133 require some type of remedial instruction at all grade
levels if there are twenty or more students with limited English proficiency in the same language group. The Lau Guidelines allow
school districts to employ either ESL or High Intensive Language
Training Programs in the secondary schools and permit three variations of bilingual programs at the elementary and intermediate
levels: multilingual/multicultural education, bilingual/bicultural
education, and transitional bilingual/bicultural education.' 34 The
guidelines also specify identification and evaluation procedures,
teacher qualifications, and the appropriate racial mix for classes in
which verbalization is not essential.
129. See id at 570 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's concurrence, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, questioned whether Title VI itself would
render illegal the expenditure of federal funds on the San Francisco schools without reference to the regulations and guidelines. See id. at 570.
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 80(3) (1980); 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
131. See Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.--C.L. L. REV. 133, 153-54
(1978). Since no specific remedial program is required under Lau, school districts could
possibly operate token programs to avert the termination of federal funds. One commentator, therefore, argues that a strict scrutiny standard of review should be applied to vindicate
these statutory rights as well. See Comment, The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in
America's Public Schools. Testing Groundfor a Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretationof
Equal Protection, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 473, 501 (1979). Courts, however, might order bilingual/bicultural programs upon finding a statutory violation. Acting pursuant to its equitable powers under Title VI, the Tenth Circuit in Serna affirmed such an order by the district
court. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974). Whether
equitable powers do exist to remedy statutory violations to the same extent they do to remedy constitutional violations, however, is open to question. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v.
Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1028 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978).
132. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, TASK FORCE FINDING SPECIFYING REMEDIES FOR ELIMINATING PAST EDUCATIONAL

PRACTICES RULES UNLAWFUL UNDER LAU V. NICHOLS (1975).
133. The Department of Education has not published any proposed or final rules to
replace the Lau Guidelines. Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Asssistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, United States Department of Education, to Debra Dobray (March 1, 1983) (discussing replacement of Lau Guidelines).
134. For a more thorough discussion of the Lau Guidelines see Rotberg, Some Legal
and Research Considerations in Establishing Federal Policy in Bilingual Education, 52 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 149 (1982).
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On the whole, the Lau Guidelines represent a rather ambitious
definition of a school district's obligations under Title VI. The
question remains whether they will be granted the same deference
granted to the administrative regulations by the Supreme Court in
Lau. The Lau Guidelines were not promulgated pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act and therefore lack an administrative
rule's force of law. While the Lau Court relied in part on similar
guidelines, Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion observed that
such guidelines must be "reasonably related to the purpose of the
enabling legislation."'' 35 Perhaps, therefore, these guidelines exceed
the authority of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act.
Concluding that the Lau Guidelines were not the sort of administrative document to which courts customarily give great weight, the
Fifth Circuit in Castanedav. Pickard1 36 refused to find a school district's remedial language program violative of Title VI even though
it varied from the guidelines' requisites. 37 Other courts, however,
have apparently elevated the guidelines to the status of statutory obligations. 38 In Cintron the district court held that the school district's remedial language program and its proposed program did not
comport with the guidelines in: 1) identifying English deficient
students; 2) monitoring their progress through the use of recognized
tests; 3) training bilingual teachers and aides; 4) providing a method
for transferring students out of the program when the necesary level
of English proficiency was attained; 5) adequately addressing the
cultural component of the program; and, 6) allowing linguistic minorities to be isolated into ethnically identifiable classes. Consequently, the court found the district to be in violation of Title VI
and directed the school officials to submit a plan for complying with
135. Lau V. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court
relied on guidelines set forth in 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
136. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
137. See id at 1007.
138. See Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 962-68 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (guidelines interpreting requirements of Title VI and Education for All Handicapped Children Act regarding placement criteria for special classes merit strict enforcement); Rios v. Read, 480 F.
Supp. 14, 23 (ED.N.Y. 1978) (school district whose remedial program did not comply with
Lau Guidelines was in violation of Title VI). Professor van Geel, in evaluating the right of
speakers of Black English to special training in Standard English, argues that if the Depart-

ment of Education issued a rule pursuant to Title V1 requiring such a program, courts would
probably sustain it. See van Geel, The Right To Be Taught Standard English. Exploring the
Implications of Lau v. Nichols for Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 900-05

(1974).
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39
the guidelines.'1
Even if courts defer to the Lau Guidelines, ESL programs may be
utilized since the guidelines suggest that exceptions will be made to
the bilingual/bicultural requirements if a school district can justify
its approach. How rigorous an evaluation will courts be willing to
make of such remedial programs, which differ from the giidelines,
in determining their compliance with Title VI? Some courts are reluctant to hold that only a certain type of remedial language program is appropriate, choosing instead to approve the good faith
efforts of educators whose programs meet the threshold test of not
being a permanent dead-end track. 4 ° Other courts have critically

examined a school district's methods in terms of its effectiveness. 4'
In conclusion, even if Title VI may be violated without the presence
of a discriminatory intent, under both federal court decisions and
agency regulations, remedial relief may be appropriate only when a

significant number of limited English-speaking students are denied
an equal opportunity. Further, that remedial relief may not be defined as bilingual/bicultural education.
139. See Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
140. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1978); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,521 F.2d 465, 482-83 (10th Cir. 1975);
Otero v. Mesa Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 171 (D. Col. 1975); cf. Heavy
Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Mont. 1981) (court suggested as alternative to
court determination, that parties strive to develop remediation program suitable to both
school district officials and parents of linguistically handicapped children); Deerfield Hutterian Assoc. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1229 (D.S.D. 1979) (offer to provide remedial program fulfilled school district's obligations).
141. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974)
(district's program which offered Title VI program for preschool children, thirty minutes per
day Spanish instruction for children in first four grades, teaching aide at Junior High School
level to service linguistically handicapped children, and ethnics studies course in high school
amounts to token effort); see also Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Aspira of
New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The parties in
Aspira previously had joined in a consent decree which provided for a comprehensive bilingual/bicultural program. Subsequently, the district court, critically scrutinizing the school
board's efforts to implement the order, found them in contempt and directed them to focus
their efforts on providing an effective remediation program. See Aspira of New York, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Comment, The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in America's Public Schools. Testing Groundfor a Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation of Equal Protection, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 473, 486-87 (1979).
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THE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES ACT AND
REMEDIAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) prohibits states from denying equal educational opportunities to individuals on account of race, color, sex, or national origin by failing
"to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by students in it's instructional programs."'' 42 Thus, the EEOA's protection extends to all individuals
and not just to groups of linguistic minorities. Arguably, the EEOA
as a whole proscribes conduct which is permissible under the Constitution 143 and potentially affords greater relief to students of limited English proficiency. The EEOA does not appear to require
proof of discriminatory intent as a necessary element to establish a
violation' 44 . Moreover, the statutory prohibition encompasses denials of equal opportunity on account of race; therefore, a suspect
class need not be the target of the state action. Language barriers
closely associated with race should merit remedial action.' 45 In
Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School Children v. Michigan
Boardof Education, 146 the district court held that the EEOA extends

protection to students who speak "[b]lack English" reasoning that
the definition of language barriers was not limited to foreign lan-

142. Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976).
143. Compare United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir.
1977) (congressional declaration of policy goes beyond rights guaranteed to school children
under fourteenth amendment in prohibiting student assignment on basis of sex) with Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1981) (discriminatory conduct in employment practices proscribed by EEOA is co-extensive with fourteenth amendment and does
not encompass conduct which might violate Title VI).
144. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1981); Martin Luther
King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027, 1031 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
145. In Heavy Runner v. Bremner, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that Indian students who alleged that they had limited proficiency
in English may exhibit the type of language barrier referred to in the statute since the native
Blackfeet language was primarily or partially spoken in their homes by various family members. In denying the motion, the court also relied on the school district's applications for
federal grants which stated that over seventy percent of the Indian children tested were
deficient in English. See Heavy Runner v. Bremmer, 522 F. Supp. 162, 163 (D.Mont. 1981)
(memorandum opinion).
146. 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (E.D. Mich. 1978), decided sub nom. Martin Luther King
Jr. Elem. School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich.
1979).
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guage barriers.1 47 Subsequently, the court found that such students
faced a language barrier because school officials failed to recognize

the black vernacular. 148 In finding a denial of equal opportunity,

the court relied on expert testimony that the failure to recognize the
learning
dialect caused children to feel ashamed and impeded their
49
community.
their
in
accepted
was
English
black
since
Prevailing on the liability issue may be easier for plaintiffs under
the EEOA than under the Constitution or Title VI. Will the remedial relief ordered pursuant to the EEOA, however, be as expansive
as that available under a court's equity jurisdiction to remedy constitutional violations or under Title VI if the court follows the Lau
Guidelines? In approving the school district's remedial program the
court in Guadalupe held that the appropriate action required of the
state under the EEOA need not include bilingual programs staffed
with bilingual teachers nor specific programs to address the cultural
needs of linguistic minorities. 5 ' Likewise, in Deefield HlutterianAssociation v. Ipswich Board of Education, ' the court found the af-

firmative steps taken by the school district to be sufficient to satisfy
the statutory requirements of the EEOA. The plaintiffs in Deerfield
were Hutterite children who spoke an oral language, Tyrolean German. For religious reasons, the Hutterites discouraged association
with non-Hutterites; therefore, few Hutterite children attended
school after education was no longer compulsory. As a result, few
qualified teachers were available to conduct bilingual education
programs. Faced with this difficult situation, the Ipswich Board of
Education offered to do whatever was necessary to establish a bilingual/bicultural program in the town's schools. The Hutterites, however, refused to allow their children to leave the colony to attend the
147. Id at 1332. Although this definition of a language barrier may be expansive, the
court subsequently warned that:
Section 1703(f) cannot be used as a vehicle to attack all the problems engendered by
poverty and racial discrimination even if these are problems with which the plaintiffs

are confronted. This court does not intend to permit an expansion of the duty created
by § 1703(f) to include elimination of what plaintiffs identify as cultural and economic
barriers.
Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027,
1030 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
148. See id. at 1375-76.
149. See id.at 1375-77.
150. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1030

(9th Cir. 1978).
151. 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1232-33 (D.S.D. 1979).
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schools, arguing that their children would suffer psychological damage from being exposed to a world in which their religious beliefs
would be questioned. The court held that the school board's goodfaith overture satisfied the appropriate action mandates of the
EEOA. 52 Conversely, in holding that the school district's remedial
programs violated the EEOA, the courts in Rios and Cintron defined
appropriate action to include bilingual education.153 The Rios
court, reading the EEOA in conjunction with Title VI, also noted
that "though not expressly provided by statute, the legislative history suggests that the program must also be bicultural as a psychological support to the subject matter instruction."' 54 The Cintron
court determined that the deficiencies of the district's remedial proof the purpose of a bilingual program
gram constituted a perversion
55
and a misuse of funds.
The duties of a school district under the EEOA seem unclear.
The decision in Martin Luther King is particularly troublesome for
several reasons.' 56 First, the language barrier did not stem from a
lack of understandable communication between the students and
teachers. Rather, the court found that the barrier existed because
"in the process of attempting to teach the students how to speak
standard English the students are made somehow to feel inferior
and are thereby turned off from the learning process."' 57 Such a
conclusion requires substantial reliance on controversial psychological and sociological data, precarious grounds from which to derive a
violation of federal law. Second, the school district took affirmative
steps to remedy the problem. Teachers used reading materials specially designed to assist speakers of black English to learn standard
English and frequently offered tailored programs in oral reading
152. See id at 1233..

153. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 22-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Cintron v. Brentwood
Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
154. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
155. See Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D.N.Y.

1978).
156. See Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd.,
473 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1979). The plaintiffs in Martin Luther King did not

seek dual language instruction in black English and standard English for speakers of the
black vernacular. They only requested that the school district provide remedial assistance to
these students. See id. at 1373.
157. Id at 1379.
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and phonics as well. "I Third, there was no evidence that the "barier" caused the children's reading problem.' 59 The evidence inferred that, while it may have been the cause, "absences from class,
classroom misbehavior, learning disabilities, and emotional impairments" may have contributed to the problem as well. 6 ° Admitting
all these facts, the court nevertheless concluded that the school district's failure to provide leadership to help its teachers in appreciatof many
ing "black English" as a home and community language
6
black students constituted a violation of the EEOA.' 1
Rather than define the appropriate action required, the court requested that the district devise a remedial plan, which it subsequently approved in virtually all respects.' 62 The court only
amended it to require that some evaluation be made of the progress
to ascertain the effectiveness
of the students' reading skills in order
63
program.
training
of the teachers'
The Fifth Circuit embraces an approach that is more deferential
to local school authorities. In Castaneda the court expressed a reluctance to interfere in the decisions of state and local agencies as to
what type of remedial program would satisfy the "appropriate action" criteria of the EEOA. 164 The court interpreted the EEOA in
conjunction with federal laws which provide financial assistance to
school districts for developing and implementing bilingual programs. It concluded that the general thrust of this legislation was to
grant state and local authorities a substantial amount of latitude in
choosing the appropriate programs and techniques. 65 Nevertheless,
forced to evaluate the sufficiency of a school district's remedial language program, the court enunciated a test which posed three key
questions: 1) is the program premised on a legitimate educational
theory? 2) is the program, as implemented, reasonably calculated to
effectuate that theory? and, 3) after an adequate trial period, is the
158. See id at 1380.
159. See id.at 1382.
160. See id.at 1391.
161. See id. at 1383.
162. See id at 1390. Experts at the trials suggested several remedial approaches but the
court determined that the solution was within the school district's prerogative. See id. at
1377.
163. See id.at 1390.
164. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981).
165. See id at 1008-09.
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program actually overcoming the language barriers? 166
As applied to the school district involved in Castaneda, the court
determined that the remedy adopted, bilingual education, 167 was
68
recognized as being a sound approach to language remediation.
In examining that theory as implemented by the district, 169 the court
dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the program over-emphasized English skills in the primary grades to the neglect of other areas of the curriculum. It observed that even if this assertion was
valid, the choice of teaching all subjects either simultaneously or
sequentially was within the district's discretion as long as students
with limited English proficiency reached parity with their English
speaking counterparts within a reasonable amount of time. 7 " The
court, however, directed the district to administer appropriate tests
to these students in their own language to measure their progress in
areas of the curriculum other than English. '1' The court also noted
that some of the remedial language teachers employed by the district possessed a limited command of Spanish, even though they
completed a special course conducted by the state education
agency.172 Declaring competent teachers to be an essential element
of any language remediation program, the court instructed the district to improve the qualifications of its bilingual teachers. 7 3 After
ordering these changes in the school district's program, the Fifth
Circuit declined to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the program
to determine whether it fulfilled the requirements of the statute.
The court observed that:
[Sluch an inquiry may become proper after the inadequacies in the
implementation of the RISD's program, which we have identified,
166. See id at 1009-10.
167. There was no mention by the court of a cultural element in the school district's
program. See id at 1008-10.
168. See id at 1010-11.
169. See id at 1005. The school district offered bilingual education in grades kindergarten through three, English classes with Spanish-speaking aides in grades four and five,
and special diagnostic centers in grades four through twelve to identify limited Englishspeaking students and address their remedial needs. Additionally, the district offered ESL
and special tutoring to students in all grades. See id at 1005.
170. Seeid at 1010-11.
171. See id at 1013-14.
172. See id at 1012-13.
173. See id at 1013. The court also noted that while Spanish-speaking aides might be
an "appropriate interim measure" until the inadequacies of the teachers were addressed,
they could not alleviate the need for qualified bilingual instructors. See id at 1013.
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have been corrected and the program has operated with the benefit of
these improvements
for a period of time sufficient to expect meaning74
ful results.'
In sum, the degree of appropriate action which courts demand
from school districts varies from requiring them to make good faith
efforts, to requiring them to provide effective bilingual programs, to
requiring them to address language difficulties for which they might
have been a contributing factor. While the Fifth Circuit purported
to develop an analytical inquiry for examining EEOA claims, ar1 75
guably it left open more questions than it asked or answered.
While the Castaneda opinion suggests that the court will examine
the effectiveness of remedial language programs, 176 precisely how
the court will make that ultimate determination remains a mystery.
Although the protection of EEOA arguably extends to a linguistically handicapped child, that child's entitlement under the EEOA
may be limited depending on whether the child has been the object
of discrimination.
VI.

STATE STATUTES AND REMEDIAL LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

Several state statutes now address the problems of linguistic minorities. The rights of students of limited English proficiency under
these laws may or may not exceed the guarantees afforded by the
federal Constitution and federal laws, depending on the individual
state's enactment.
Some such statutes are permissive in nature. Several states, while
requiring instruction in English, permit instruction in another language as in order to assist students with limited English proficiency.' 7 7 Other state statutes, while not mandating remedial
programs, empower the state education agency to develop such pro-

174. Id at 1114-15. The court did not attempt to delineate an appropriate measure to
use in eventually determining the program's effectiveness. It did preclude the possibility of

exclusive reliance on achievement test scores since a low score could reflect the existence of
obstacles to learning other than language. See id at 1115 n. 14.
175. See id. at 1009-10. The Fifth Circuit has suggested that a less rigorous definition

of appropriate action may be applied to a school district's obligations to transfer students or
to migrant students. See id at 1005-06 n.8.
176. See id at 1009-11.

177. See IDAHO CODE § 33-1601 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 17:272-17:273 (West
Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 126.07 (West Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 189.19 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN4. § 28A.05.015 (1982).
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grams.'7 8 Still others either outline regulations for such programs or
authorize the state education agency to promulgate such guidelines
in order that school districts might qualify for state funds.' 79
On the other hand, several states require some form of remedial
assistance. Some statutes do not specify a particular type of program ' ° or delegate the responsibility for establishing requirements
to the state education agency so that school districts who operate
programs in accordance with those requirements may obtain
grants.' 8 ' Other statutes, however, require particular types of remedial programs when twenty or more students with limited English
proficiency are enrolled in a district's schools. In some states the
program is limited to three years' 82 or until English proficiency is
reached, whichever event occurs first, 8 3 although other statutes allow the students to continue in the program at the discretion
of
84
parents.
their
of
approval
the
school authorities and with
Several states set no time limit on the program.' 8 5 Additionally,
Alaska requires a bilingual/bicultural program if there are eight or86
more students of limited English proficiency in a district's schools, 1
while Wisconsin requires such a program in grades kindergarten
through three if there are ten or more such students' 87 and Califor18 8
nia requires one for ten or more students through grade six.
Most of these statutes also make available state funds for the programs 89 and several states define their program to include a cultural
178. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 4602 (Supp. 1983) (school board may provide bilingual education program); NEV. REV. STAT. § 389:150 (1979) (program to accomodate needs of American Indians); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 15-1511, 13-1327 (Purdon Supp.
1983-1984) (provisions allowing development of bilingual education program).
179. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-705 to - 708 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 2010.1-5.5-1 to -9 (Bums Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-9501 to -9510 (1980); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3204(l)-(5) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983).
180. See GA. CODE ANN. § 32-609a (1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 336.074, 336.079 (1981).
181. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-24-101 to -106 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 280.4 (West
182. See
183. See
184. See

Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-54-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:35-18-19 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 380.1151 to 380.1158 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14C-I to -3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS.

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, §2 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
185. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-17a-10-17g (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-23-1 to -6 (Supp. 1982).

186. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.400 (1982).
187. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.97(2) (West Supp. 1983-84).
188. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52179 (Deering 1978).
189. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.410 (1982); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52177(a) (Deering
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component.' 90 Statutes may also provide for optional participation
by English students in a bilingual program' 9 ' or for participation by
English deficient students with English fluent students in courses in
which verbalization is not essential, in order to mitigate the segregatory tendencies of remedial language programs. 92 Moreover, in
order to guard against the prospect that the program will become a
dead-end track, several states allow the parents to retain the right to
withdraw their child from the program. 193 Other recurring elements
of such statutes' 94 include provisions for the following: 1) the certification of bilingual teachers; 19 2) the identification of eligible students along with criteria for exit from the program;' 96 3) the
establishment of parental advisory counsels;' 97 4) the option to offer
pre-school and summer programs;' 9 s and, 5) the cooperation among
districts in providing remedial programs. 199
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-24-106(e) (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1017g (Supp. 1983-1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14c-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, § 8 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23-6
(1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 115.995 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
190. Those states include Alaska, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and Wisconsin. Connecticut and Michigan allow the cultural component to be
optional.
191. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §1 15.97(l) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
192. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14c-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, § 5 (West 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-20 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
193. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52173 (Deering Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14c-4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 380.1155 (West Supp. 19821983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.96(3) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
194. See generally Kobrick, A ModelAct Providing For TransitionalBilingualEducation
Programsin Public Schools, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 260 (1972) (suggestions as to provisions
for bilingual education statute, many of which have been incorporated into several states'
statutes).
195. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52166 (Deering Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
71A, § 6 (West 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1157 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
196. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52164 (Deering Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. 22-24-105
(Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-17b--10-17f (Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, § 2 (West 1978); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 380.1157(3) (West Supp.
1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-17 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
197. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52176 (Deering Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 14c-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1156 (West Supp.
1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.98 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
198. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14c-1 I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, § 7 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.99 (West
Supp. 1983-1984).
199. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14c-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, § 4 (West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 380.1153(4)--
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Is there possibly a nexus between state legislation regarding remedial language programs and judicial decisions? The New Mexico
statute, which provides for bilingual education, was enactd one year
after the Tenth Circuit's endorsement of bilingual education in
Serna. Comparatively, the Colorado statute, enacted in 1979, allows local school districts great latitude in administering special instruction programs and reflects the conservative approach taken by
the courts in Keyes and Otero. Arizona's statute which makes remedial language programs optional, reflects the conservative approach
taken in Guadalupe as well. Where courts have issued less definitive
statements on the rights of linguistic minorities, 2°° their legislatures
have also circumvented the issue. 2° ' Thus, a connection may exist
between judicial and legislative activity.2 °2 The last section of this
article will concentrate on the significant interaction that occurred
in defining the right to lanbetween the courts and the legislature
2
guage remediation in Texas. 03
VII.

THE RIGHT To REMEDIAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN
TEXAS

The needs of Mexican-American students prompted the evolution
of the right to remedial language instruction in Texas. 2 4 In 1969
the legislature repealed a longstanding statute which prohibited in380.1153(5) (West 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-21 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT.

ANN. § 115.977(2) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
200. See Idaho Migrant Council v. Board of Educ., 647 F.2d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1981);
Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Mont. 1981); Deerfield Hutterian
Assoc. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1228-29 (D.S.D. 1979).

201. North Dakota and Montana make no provision for remedial language programs
while only Idaho permits such programs. See IDAHO CODE § 33-1601 (1981).
202. But see Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63-64
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). Both courts envisioned
a broad federal statutory duty for school districts, yet the New York statute gives preference

to the local option alternative and merely provides guidelines for programs to qualify for
state funds. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3204(1)-3204(5) (McKinney 1981).
203. Michigan demonstrates the reverse of the Texas situation in that the court's decision in Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F.
Supp. 1371, 1391 (E.D. Mich. 1979) follows the agressive approach initially taken by the

Michigan legislature in 1977 concerning language remediation. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 380.1151-380.1158 (West Supp. 1982).
204. See generally J. VEGA, EDUCATION,

POLITICS AND

BILINGUALISM

IN TEXAS

(1983) (general discussion of need for remedial education). For a historical background on
Mexican-Americans as an identifiable ethnic group see Comment, Mexican-Americans and
the Desegregationof Schools in the Southwest, 8 Hous. L. REV. 929 (1971).
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struction in a language other than English in the state's schools to
permit remedial instruction when it would be educationally advantageous to students.20 5 Two years later, as part of a statewide desegregation order, a federal district court directed the Texas Education
Agency (TEA) to conduct a study of the educational needs of minority students and to make recommendations for compensatory
programs. 2° Subsequently, in 1973 the legislature enacted a law to
provide for bilingual/ bicultural education in grades one through
three in those school districts which enrolled at least twenty students
with limited English speaking ability at any one of those grade
levels.2 7 This law made state funds available for operational expenses and transportation costs as well.20 In 1975 the legislature
extended this funding to optional programs at the fourth and fifth
grade levels.20 9
In the same year the League of Latin American Citizens and the
G.I. Forum filed suit to "enforce" the earlier court order which directed the TEA to study the needs of minority students. Claiming
that Mexican-Americans in Texas had been subjected to de jure discrimination by the State of Texas and the TEA, the plaintiffs also
sought a comprehensive bilingual education program for the
state.210 Six years later in 1981, the district court entered its judgment in the case. The court held that the state and the TEA had
intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans and, using
its equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations, ordered a
remedial language program to eliminate the vestiges of that discrimination. 21' Although the court held that failure to provide a remedial language program was not an independent violation of the
Constitution or of Title VI, it determined that the state's limited
205. Act of March 10, 1969, ch. 289, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 871,. 871-72.

206. See United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235, 247-48 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (memorandum opinion), aff'd in part, modified andremanded in part with directions, 447 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
207. See Act of April 30, 1973, ch. 392, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen Laws 860-63. The program

was to be made available for three years or until English proficiency was reached, whichever
event occurred first, although students were allowed to re-enroll with the approval of their
parents and the school district.
208. See id
209. See Act of May 16, 1975, ch. 334, § 6, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 897.
210. In the earlier case the district court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enter-

ing any and all further orders which might become necessary to enforce or modify the decree. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 409 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
211. See id at 440-41.
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program violated the EEOA 212 and developed its own comprehensive plan for language remediation in Texas.21 3 In response to this
statewide order, the governor appointed a Task Force to examine
the existing system of education for students with limited English
proficiency and to make recommendations for remedying their linguistic difficulties. 2 4 The report of this Task Force formed the basis
of the comprehensive Bilingual Education and Special Languages
Program Statute passed by the legislature in June of 1981.215
Despite this enactment, the district court refused to vacate its remedial order as moot. 21 6 It found the statutory program to be inadequate in three respects: 1) in failing to specifically prescribe
eligibility criteria, 2) in allowing the state too much time to propose
a plan to employ and train a sufficient number of bilingual teachers,
and 3) in exempting from its coverage school districts with fewer
than twenty students of limited English proficiency in any one grade
from the obligation of providing remedial instruction.21 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision on
several grounds. 2 '8 The appellate court determined that the stipula-

tions entered into on behalf of the state did not support a finding of
historical discrimination against Mexican-Americans in Texas.219
212. See id. at 437. The court reasoned that restricting a bilingual program to the lower
primary grades failed to ameliorate the effects of the statewide system of discrimination
against Mexican-Americans since students at all grade levels bore the burden of discrimination. See id at 437.
213. See id at 436-41. The court rejected the Lau Guidelines as being dispositive in
the formulation of an appropriate remedy. The court's plan provided bilingual education
for all Mexican-American students of limited English proficiency. It specified procedures
for identifying such students as well as for testing those students before they exited from the
program. It also directed the TEA to monitor the efforts of the local districts to comply with
the order. See id at 439-41.
214. Exec. Order WPC-20 (March 10, 1981), 6 Tex. Reg. 959 (1981).
215. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.451-21.463 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
216. United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 733 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
217. See id at 733.
218. United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1982).
219. See id at 369. The court found that the stipulations could support only two factual conclusions:
The first is that at some past time in Texas, total immersion in English, the dominant
language of our culture, was viewed at the best and fastest way to master it. The second
is that about 40 years ago intentional de facto segregation of Mexican-American students occurred in as many as 2.1 percent of Texas school districts, the largest percentage
for which counsel could find written assertion in the literature of the subject. It is difficult for us to avoid concluding that these form a slender basis indeed for the sweeping
statewide order imposed by the trial court on the basis of past constitutional violations.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss2/2

42

Dobray: Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Remedial Language Instruct

19841

REMEDIAL LANGUA GE INSTRUCTION

Additionally, in observing that procedural irregularities permeated
the trial of the case, the court resolved that "a procedure so fundamentally flawed cannot . ..serve as an appropriate basis for the
far-ranging and essentially legislative remedial order entered by the
trial court. ' 220 Finally, the court concluded that in the absence of
proof establishing a state-sanctioned system of discrimination, no
remedial order based on unconstitutionally invidious local practices
could be entered without first affording each school district an opportunity to be heard. 22' Although the district court held that the
state's 1981 remedial language program failed the second prong of
the Castaneda test 2 22 because it relied too heavily on ESL instruction in the upper grade levels,223 the Fifth Circuit declined to express an opinion on whether the legislative scheme complied with
the EEOA. The appellate court reiterated the notion of local responsibility by stating that appropriate action under the EEOA was
a question peculiar to each school district.2 24
The Texas statute requires a transitional bilingual/bicultural program in the elementary grades and either bilingual/bicultural education or ESL instruction in the post-elementary grades when school
districts enroll twenty or more students with limited proficiency in
English in the same grade level in any language classification.225
Pursuant to its authority to promulgate rules under the act, the State
Board of Education requires school districts to offer some type of
remedial assistance by administrative regulations even where there
are less than twenty such students as well.2 26 Local districts, however, can exercise flexibility in their approach since the statute allows remedial programs to take account of an individual student's
learning experiences.227
Id. at 369.
220. Id. at 370.
221. See id.at 372-73; see also United States v. Gregory-Portland Indep. School Dist.,
654 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981) (since state agency has no authority over location of
schools or assignment of students under state law, segregatory intent must be establised in
each district.).
222. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981).
223. United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 435-39 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
224. United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 374 (5th Cir. 1982).
225. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.451 - 21.463 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
226. Tex. Educ. Agency, 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 77.352 (Shepard's May 1,1982).
227. See id.§ 77.353(b)(1). Administrative rules provide that the degree of emphasis
placed upon each component of a bilingual program be dependent upon the language proficiency and the social, emotional and achievement levels of the individual child. The regula-
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The statute contains provisions similar to those of other states in
that it provides for state funding for programs, cooperation among
districts in establishing programs, optional pre-school and summer
programs, participation by English-speaking students in the programs, parental approval of a child's placement in the program, and
a "language proficiency assessment committee" in each district to
involve parents in the operation of the program. It allows the State
Bcard of Education to establish rules for the certification of bilingual education teachers 228 and to establish evaluation criteria for enrolling students in and exiting them from the program. 229 The rules
regarding evaluation criteria subsequently promulgated by the State
Board of Education, however, do not provide for testing students in
other subjects in their primary language. The Castenada court
thought such testing to be essential in order to measure the adetions also allow the time alloted to each student for ESL instruction to be based on the
English language competency of the student. Arguably, such flexibility is crucial because at
a certain level of proficiency dual language instruction may confuse the students demonstrated by the following graph:
90% English
10% Spanish
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P
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2

N
S
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3
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1
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90% Spanish

2
3
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4

For example, students exhibiting a proficiency level of blocks A and B are "English dominant" and may regress if they are required to develop their Spanish skills to that same level.
228. See id § 141.216. The rules require additional college level courses for teachers
seeking endorsements for bilingual education or ESL. Perhaps this fairly rigorous requirement is in response to the Castaneda court's determination that the TEA training program
did not adequately prepare some of the teachers in the school district.
229. Tex. Educ. Agency, 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 77.356 (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
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quacy of a language remediation program under the EEOA. 230 The

statute also requires the TEA to apply sanctions, which may include
loss of state funding or accreditation to a district which fails to comply with the law. This provision is troublesome in light of Fifth
Circuit decisions which allow districts an opportunity to answer for
alleged failures to comply with federal law.2 3 ' The State Board of
Education's rules, however, promulgated in conjunction with the
statute provide procedural safeguards.232
Texas' law offers substantial remedial assistance to linguistic minorities. Nevertheless, well over seventy-one languages are spoken
in Texas schools and as of early 1983, over eleven thousand students
with limited proficiency in English received neither ESL instruction
nor bilingual education.233 Thus, some school districts still may not
be fulfilling their obligations under the Constitution, federal laws, or
state law-although exactly what some of those obligations entail
remain far from clear.
230. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1981).
231. See United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Gregory-Portland Indep. School Dist., 654 F.2d 989, 998 (5th Cir. 1981).
232. Tex. Educ. Agency, 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 77.365 (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
233. LANGUAGE TALLY No. 14C, DivisioN OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION, TEXAS
EDUCATION AGENCY, January 3, 1983.
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